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ABSTRACT
Essays on Risk Aversion. (August 2006)
Paan Jindapon, B.A., Thammasat University;
M.A., Southern Methodist University;
M.B.A., Thammasat University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Neilson
This dissertation contains three essays on risk aversion. In the first essay, we an-
alyze comparative risk aversion in a new way, through a comparative statics problem
in which, for a cost, agents can shift from an initial probability distribution toward
a preferred distribution. The Ross characterization arises when the original distri-
bution is riskier than the preferred distribution and the cost is monetary, and the
Arrow-Pratt characterization arises when the original distribution differs from the
preferred distribution by a simple mean-preserving spread and the cost is a utility
cost. Higher-order increases in risk lead to higher-order generalizations, and the com-
parative statics method yields a unified approach to the problem of comparative risk
attitudes.
In the second essay, we analyze decisions made by a group of terrorists and a
government in a zero-sum game in which the terrorists minimize a representative
citizen’s expected utility and the government maximizes it. The terrorists’ strategy
balances the probability and the severity of the attack while the government chooses
the level of investment reducing the probability and/or mitigating the severity. We
find that if the representative citizen is risk neutral, the terrorists’ response is not
associated with the government’s action and the representative citizen’s risk attitudes
affect the strategies of the government and the terrorists. Risk aversion always in-
creases equilibrium severity but does not always increase equilibrium expenditure of
iv
the government.
In the last essay, we consider a situation in which an individual has to pay for
a good before he realizes the state-dependent surplus of the good. This ex-ante
willingness to pay is called the option price and the difference between the option
price and the expected surplus is the option value. We find that the option value
actually is the buying price for a fixed payment of the expected surplus, and there is
a special case in which the option value equals the negative of the compensating risk
premium. We also find the effects on the option price and the option value when the
expected utility assumption is replaced by a rank-dependent expected utility.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains three chapters on risk aversion. In the next chapter, we
consider a problem in which two agents are endowed with one payoff probability dis-
tribution, but for a set monetary cost can move toward another, less risky payoff
distribution. Which individual spends more on improving his payoff distribution?
Intuition suggests that the more risk averse individual is willing to spend more to
improve the distribution. The literature, however, contains two notions of more risk
averse. The Arrow-Pratt characterization is consistent with one individual with non-
stochastic initial wealth being willing to pay more than another to avoid a mean-zero
risk, while the Ross characterization is consistent with one individual with random
initial wealth being willing to pay more than another to avoid a conditionally mean-
zero risk. But which characterization is consistent with the more risk averse individual
choosing a less risky final payoff distribution in the comparative statics problem?
In Chapter III, we study the impact of risk aversion of a representative citizen
in a game played by a government and a terrorist organization. Suppose that the
terrorist organization believes that if a representative member of the target population
becomes sufficiently dissatisfied, a policy change is enacted. The well-being of the
representative citizen is measured by her expected utility. Therefore the terrorist
uses his resources to minimize the target citizen’s expected utility. In response to
threat of the terrorists, the government of the target country may undertake some
costly actions that help prevent attacks or mitigate their severity. The strategic
variable of the terrorists is the severity level of the attack, which is negatively related
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Economic Theory.
2to the probability of an attack because of resource constraints. The government
chooses an optimal level of action that mitigates the severity and/or reduces the
attack probability.
In Chapter IV, we consider a situation in which an individual has to pay for
a good before he knows whether or not he will consume the good in the future, or
before he realizes the true surplus of consuming the good. If the surplus depends
on the state of nature which is unknown at the moment, what will be his ex-ante
willingness to pay for this good? This ex-ante willingness to pay is called the option
price because it can be thought of the price for an option to consume this good in
the future. It is possible that the individual’s option price is greater or less than the
expected surplus. The difference between the option price and the expected surplus
is the option value. The goals of this chapter are to find a relationship between the
option value and individual’s risk premium, and to see how the option price and the
option value change when the individual is not an expected utility maximizer. We
present the summary of the dissertation in Chapter V.
3CHAPTER II
HIGHER-ORDER GENERALIZATIONS OF RISK AVERSION
A. Introduction
Consider a problem in which two agents are endowed with one payoff probability
distribution, but for a set monetary cost can move toward another, less risky payoff
distribution. Which individual spends more on improving his payoff distribution?
Intuition suggests that the more risk averse individual is willing to spend more to
improve the distribution. The literature, however, contains two notions of more risk
averse. The Arrow-Pratt characterization is consistent with one individual with non-
stochastic initial wealth being willing to pay more than another to avoid a mean-zero
risk, while the Ross characterization is consistent with one individual with random ini-
tial wealth being willing to pay more than another to avoid a conditionally mean-zero
risk.1 But which characterization is consistent with the more risk averse individual
choosing a less risky final payoff distribution in the comparative statics problem?
We find that the stronger, Ross characterization of comparative risk aversion
governs behavior in the comparative statics problem, thereby providing a new method
of deriving the Ross characterization. This derivation raises two other issues. First,
since the Arrow-Pratt characterization is not sufficiently strong to govern behavior in
the simple comparative statics problem given above, is there a different comparative
statics problem for which the Arrow-Pratt characterization does govern behavior?2
The answer turns out to be affirmative, and the Arrow-Pratt characterization can
1See Pratt [33], Arrow [1], and Ross [36]. Machina and Neilson [26] extend the
notions to a differentiable non-expected utility setting.
2Chiu [13] provides a different approach to generating both the Arrow-Pratt and
Ross characterizations of risk aversion.
4be recovered if the cost of moving from the risky initial distribution toward the less
risky distribution is a utility cost instead of a monetary one. The problem leading
to the Ross characterization is more natural than the one leading to the Arrow-
Pratt characterization, though, because the former requires that two individuals with
different utility functions face the same monetary cost but the latter requires that
two individuals with different utility functions face the same utility cost, which may
be problematic. Second, can similar comparative statics problems be used to derive
characterizations of higher-order risk attitudes? Again the answer is affirmative,
and the paper derives higher-order versions of both the Ross and the Arrow-Pratt
characterizations.
The comparative statics approach to deriving characterizations of comparative
risk attitudes has several advantages. The primary one is that the approach provides
a unified method of getting all of the higher orders of both the Ross and the Arrow-
Pratt characterizations. This is not the only advantage, though. The higher-order
analysis provides a link between the properties of probability distributions (such as
mean preserving spreads) and the derivatives of the utility functions. Ekern [18] and
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [16] also establish links between properties of probabil-
ity distributions and the derivatives of the utility functions, but in an absolute, as
opposed to comparative, sense.3 Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger provide a unified frame-
work for constructing the different higher order notions of risk aversion based on the
change in expected utility from alternately adding noise and disaggregating risks in
successive gambles. We provide a different unified framework for achieving the same
3For example, they provide links analogous to that between a desire for mean-
preserving decreases in risk and the concavity of the utility function, while this paper
provides links analogous to that between one agent having more of a desire for mean-
preserving decreases in risk and one agent having a more concave utility function (in
the Ross sense).
5result, based on a comparative statics exercise.
A second advantage of the comparative statics approach is that Machina [25]
shows that comparative statics results like these extend to differentiable non-expected
utility preferences. Finally, the approach can be thought of as a higher-order version
of Ehrlich and Becker’s [17] self-protection problem. In their original problem agents
faced a binary payoff distribution and could pay to reduce the probability of the low
outcome and raise the probability of the high outcome. Dionne and Eeckhoudt [15],
and Briys and Schlesinger [5] show that the willingness of one agent to pay for more
self-protection than another is not monotonically related to risk attitudes. The nega-
tive result is driven by the fact that the individuals pay for a first-order stochastically
dominating shift in the original self-protection problem, but our paper shows that
when individuals pay for higher-order improvements behavior is governed by risk
attitudes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate how comparative statics
problems can uncover the Ross and Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion. Section 3
generalizes the Ross measure to higher order risks, and Section 4 does the same for
the Arrow-Pratt measure. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
B. Two Measures of Comparative Risk Aversion
An expected utility maximizing agent’s initial monetary payoff is determined by the
distribution function F with support contained in [0,M ]. Let G be another distribu-
tion with support contained in [0,M ] and which the agent strictly prefers to F . The
betweenness property of expected utility implies that for any t ∈ [0, 1] he prefers G
to the mixture (1− t)F + tG, which in turn he prefers to F . Furthermore, repeated
application of the betweenness property implies that if t1 > t2 then he strictly prefers
6(1− t1)F + t1G to (1− t2)F + t2G. Now suppose that the agent can choose to improve
his payoff distribution from F (·) toH(·, t) = (1−t)F (·)+tG(·) for a cost of c(t), where
c(0) = 0, c(1) =M ,4 and c′ > 0. We are interested in conditions governing when one
agent chooses a higher value of t than another. The agent’s objective function is
U(t) =
∫ M
0
u(x− c(t))dH(x, t),
and he chooses t to maximize U(t). The utility function u is assumed to be strictly
increasing, concave, and twice continuously differentiable. We assume throughout
that U ′′ < 0 so that the first-order condition identifies a maximum. The first-order
condition is
∫ M
0
u(x− c(t∗))d[G(x)− F (x)]−
∫ M
0
u′(x− c(t∗))c′(t∗)dH(x, t∗) = 0. (2.1)
Suppose that G differs from F by a mean-preserving decrease in risk, as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz [37]. Integration by parts yields
∫ M
0
u(x− c(t∗))d[G(x)− F (x)] = −
∫ M
0
u′′(x− c(t∗))
∫ x
0
[F (y)−G(y)]dydx,
and
∫ x
0
[F (y) − G(y)]dy > 0, for all x ∈ [0,M ]. Consequently, (2.1) can be
rewritten
−
∫M
0
u′′(x− c(t∗)) ∫ x
0
[F (y)−G(y)]dydx∫M
0
u′(x− c(t∗))dH(x, t∗)
− c′(t∗) = 0. (2.2)
Compare two agents with utility functions u and v and optimal values tu and tv,
4The sole purpose of this assumption is to guarantee the existence of an interior
solution.
7respectively. Agent u is more Ross risk averse than v if
−u
′′(y)
u′(z)
≥ −v
′′(y)
v′(z)
for all y, z ∈ [−M,M ]. Under this condition,
− u
′′(y)∫M
0
u′(z)dH(z)
≥ − v
′′(y)∫M
0
v′(z)dH(z)
for all y ∈ [−M,M ], and therefore the first term in (2.2) is larger for u than it is
for v, and
−
∫M
0
v′′(x− c(tu))
∫ x
0
[F (y)−G(y)]dydx∫M
0
v′(x− c(tu))dH(x, t∗)
− c′(tu) ≤ 0.
It follows that tu ≥ tv, and the more Ross risk averse agent chooses a less risky,
but costlier distribution.
While the Ross measure of risk aversion is sufficient for comparing the chosen t
for any F that is a mean-preserving increasing in risk of G, the Arrow-Pratt measure
of risk aversion is not. Agent u is more Arrow-Pratt risk averse than v if
−u
′′(x)
u′(x)
≥ −v
′′(x)
v′(x)
for all x ∈ [−M,M ]. For example, let u(w) = −e−9w and v(w) = −e−7w, so that
u is more Arrow-Pratt risk averse than v. Let x ∈ [0, 1], F (x) = x, and
G(x) =

0 if 0 ≤ x < 0.4;
5x− 2 if 0.4 ≤ x < 0.6;
1 if 0.6 ≤ x ≤ 1,
with c(t) = t2, which yields an interior solution for both agents. Agents u and v
maximize expected utility when tu = 0.087 and tv = 0.103, so that the more Arrow-
8Pratt risk averse agent chooses the lower value of t.
Now consider an alternative problem characterized by the objective function
U¯(t) =
∫ M
0
u(x)dH(x, t)− c(t),
where, as before, it is assumed that U¯ ′′ ≤ 0 so the first-order condition identifies
a maximum. The first-order condition is
∫ M
0
u(x)d[G(x)− F (x)] = c′(t). (2.3)
This time assume that F differs from G by a simple mean-preserving spread as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz [37], so that F and G have the same mean and there exists a
payoff x0 such that F (x) ≥ G(x) for all x ∈ [0, x0] and F (x) ≤ G(x) for all x ∈ [x0,M ],
and the cost function is increasing and convex. Let tu and tv be the optimal values of
t for u and v, respectively, and scale u and v so that u′(x0) = v′(x0) > 0 . Consider
the expression
θ =
[∫M
0
u(x)d[G(x)− F (x)]
u′(x0)
]
−
[∫M
0
v(x)d[G(x)− F (x)]
v′(x0)
]
.
If θ ≥ 0, then c′(tu)/u′(x0) ≥ c′(tv)/v′(x0). Because u′(x0) = v′(x0) and c(t) is
convex, it follows that tu ≥ tv. Integrating by parts yields
θ = −
∫ M
0
[
u′(x)
u′(x0)
− v
′(x)
v′(x0)
]
[G(x)− F (x)]dx.
Pratt [33] proves that u is more Arrow-Pratt risk averse than v if and only if
u′(x)/u′(y) ≤ v′(x)/v′(y) for all y < x. Consequently, when x < x0 the term in
large brackets is nonnegative but G(x)− F (x) is nonpositive, while when x > x0 the
term in large brackets is nonpositive but G(x) − F (x) is nonnegative, and therefore
9the integrand is always nonpositive. Therefore θ ≥ 0 and tu ≥ tv, so that the more
Arrow-Pratt risk averse agent chooses a less risky, but more costly distribution.
The first maximization problem leads to Ross risk aversion, while the second
problem leads to Arrow-Pratt risk aversion. In the first optimization problem costs
are monetary and subtracted from the monetary payoff inside the utility function. In
the second problem costs are utility costs and subtracted outside the utility function,
which is troubling because the problem assumes that the utility cost function is
the same for both agents. Monetary costs must therefore be different for the two
individuals, making the second problem far less natural than the first one.
C. Higher-Order Ross Measures of Risk Aversion
In this section, we generalize the problem of maximizing U(t) to higher orders of risk.
Let u(n) denote the nth derivative of u(x). For convenience, define F1(x) = F (x) and
Fk(x) =
∫ x
0
Fk−1(z)dz for k = 2, 3, . . . , n. If Fk(M) = Gk(M) for k = 2, 3, . . . , n, then
integration by parts yields
∫ M
0
u(x− c(t∗))d[F (x)−G(x)] = (−1)n−1
∫ M
0
u(n)(x− c(t∗))[Fn(y)−Gn(y)]dx.
We can rewrite (2.1), the first-order condition for maximizing U(t), as
(−1)n−1 ∫M
0
u(n)(x− c(t∗))[Fn(x)−Gn(x)]dx∫M
0
u′(x− c(t∗))dH(x, t∗)
− c′(t∗) = 0. (2.4)
Adopting Ekern’s [18] definition of having more nth degree risk, for n ≥ 2, we
say that F has more nth degree risk than G if (i) Fk(M) = Gk(M) for k = 1, . . . , n;
and (ii) Fn(x) ≥ Gn(x) for all x ∈ [0,M ] and Fn(x) > Gn(x) for some x ∈ (0,M).
Note that if F has more nth degree risk than G, then the first n − 1 moments of F
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and G are equal. In this and the next section, we assume that F (0) = G(0) = 0 and,
where applicable, F is the distribution with more nth degree risk.
The utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing and infinitely contin-
uously differentiable. An agent u is nth degree risk averse if (−1)nu(n)(x) < 0 for all
x ∈ [−M,M ]. This definition also follows Ekern [18].5 In his paper, Ekern shows that
F has more nth degree risk than G if and only if every nth degree risk averter prefers
G to F . Similar to the previous section, we assume that U is concave in t so that
the second-order condition holds, and that the cost function c(t) is increasing with
c(0) = 0 and c(1) = M so that the chosen t falls in the [0, 1] interval. Consequently,
H(·; t) = (1− t)F (·) + tG(·) is a distribution function that has more nth degree risk
than G and less nth degree risk than F .
Proposition 1 Let t∗ maximize U(t) =
∫M
0
u(x−c(t))dH(x, t). For any distribution
function F which is nth degree riskier than G, t∗ > 0 if and only if the agent is nth
degree risk averse.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 1 identifies the relationship between nth degree risk aversion and the
chosen value of t when F has more nth degree risk than G. For n = 2, Proposition
1 implies that for any distribution function F that is a mean-preserving increase in
risk of G, t∗ > 0 if and only if the agent is risk averse.6
5The utility function u exhibits mixed risk aversion, as defined by Caballe and
Pomansky [7], if it exhibits nth degree risk aversion for every n. Caballe and Pomansky
claim that most utility functions used in examples exhibit mixed risk aversion.
6Meyer and Ormiston [29] use comparative statics analysis to address a different
problem, identifying distributional changes preferred by every risk averse expected
utility maximizer. Their result takes the form: [Assume the agent is risk averse.
Then F differs from G by a shift of type if and only if t∗ > 0.] Our result, in
contrast, takes the form: [Assume that F is riskier than G. Then u is risk averse if
and only if t∗ > 0.]
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For n = 3, Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler [27] define F having more 3rd degree
risk than G as F having more downside risk than G, and 3rd degree risk aversion as
downside risk aversion. Therefore, from the Theorem 1, for any distribution function
F that has more downside risk than G, t∗ > 0 if and only if the agent is downside risk
averse. The definition of 3rd degree risk aversion also coincides with Kimball’s [22]
definition of prudence, by which he means the motive for precautionary saving. Eeck-
houdt and Schlesinger [16] state that a prudent agent prefers adding zero-mean risk
to a higher wealth level than to a lower wealth level. Similarly, our result shows that
a prudent agent always prefers a probability distribution function that is less risky
at the lower wealth level, in other words, a distribution function with less downside
risk.
For n = 4, Menezes and Wang [28] define F having more 4th degree risk than G
as F having more outer risk than G. Theorem 1, then, shows how outer risk aversion
is governed by the fourth derivative of the utility function. Bigelow and Menezes [4]
provide a comparative statics approach, albeit one different from the one used here,
to analyzing outer risk.
This section’s main result compares the optimal t chosen by different agents.
Theorem 2 describes the necessary and sufficient condition for one agent to choose to
shift the probability distribution closer to G than another, or in other words, choose
a larger t∗.
Definition 1 u is more nth degree Ross risk averse than v if
(−1)n−1u
(n)(x)
u′(y)
≥ (−1)n−1v
(n)(x)
v′(y)
for all x, y ∈ [−M,M ].
Proposition 2 Let u and v be nth degree risk averse, and let tu and tv maximize
12
U(t) =
∫M
0
u(x − c(t))dH(x, t) and V (t) = ∫M
0
v(x − c(t))dH(x, t), respectively. For
any distribution function F which is nth degree riskier than G, tu ≥ tv if and only if
u is more nth degree Ross risk averse than v.
Proof. If: Let Hu and Hv denote the distributions chosen by agents u and v, respec-
tively, and let yu solve u
′(yu) =
∫M
0
u′(x− c(tu))dHu(x). Rescale the utility function
v so that v′(yu) =
∫M
0
v′(x− c(tu))dHu(x). The first-order conditions of agents u and
v can be written as
(−1)n−1
∫ M
0
u(n)(x− c(tu))
u′(yu)
[Fn(x)−Gn(x)]dx− c′(tu) = 0 (2.5)
and
(−1)n−1
∫M
0
v(n)(x− c(tv))[Fn(x)−Gn(x)]dx∫M
0
v′(x− c(tv))dHv(x)
− c′(tv) = 0 (2.6)
respectively.
Consider the expression
θ =
[
(−1)n−1
∫ M
0
u(n)(x− c(tu))
u′(yu)
[Fn(x)−Gn(x)]dx
]
−
[
(−1)n−1
∫ M
0
v(n)(x− c(tu))
v′(yu)
[Fn(x)−Gn(x)]dx
]
.
We have tu ≥ tv if and only if θ ≥ 0. Since (−1)n−1 u(n)(x)u′(yu) ≥ (−1)n−1
v(n)(x)
v′(yu) for all
x ∈ [−M,M ] and Fn(x) ≥ Gn(x) for all x ∈ [0,M ], then θ ≥ 0, and hence tu ≥ tv.
Only if: Suppose that there exist y, z ∈ (−M,M) such that (−1)n−1 u(n)(z)
u′(y) <
(−1)n−1 v(n)(z)
v′(y) . Because u ∈ C∞ , this must hold for all z in some neighborhood Z.
Construct F¯ and G¯ so that F¯ is nth degree riskier than G¯ and F¯n − G¯n is a function
whose support is in Z. Choose t so that u′(y) =
∫M
−M u
′(z)d[(1− t)F¯ (z)+ tG¯(z)]. Fix
c so that the chosen t is tu. Let x = z + c(tu), and let X be the open set obtained by
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adding c(tu) to all z ∈ Z. Then (−1)n−1 u(n)(x−c(tu))u′(y) < (−1)n−1 v
(n)(x−c(tu))
v′(y) all x ∈ X.
Define F (x) = F¯ (x− c(tu)). Then F is nth degree riskier than G and the support of
Fn−Gn is inX. It follows that θ < 0. By construction u′(y) =
∫M
0
u′(x−c(tu))dHu(x)
and v′(y) =
∫M
0
v′(x− c(tu))dHu(x), hence tu < tv. ¤
For n = 2, F differs from G by a mean-preserving increase in risk. The necessary
and sufficient condition for tu ≥ tv is u more Ross risk averse than v, as discussed
in the previous section. For n = 3, the definition of F having more 3rd degree risk
than G coincides with F having more downside risk than G. Following Modica and
Scarsini [30], u is more downside risk averse than v when u′′′(x)/u′(y) ≥ v′′′(x)/v′(y)
for all x and y. Proposition 2 states that when u and v are downside risk averse
agents, for any distribution function F having more downside risk than G, tu ≥ tv if
and only if u is more downside risk averse than v. In the context of self-protection, an
agent who is more downside risk averse will protect himself more by reducing further
the amount of downside risk, thereby bearing higher cost.
D. Higher-Order Arrow-Pratt Measures of Risk Aversion
Next we consider the problem of maximizing U¯(t), in which the cost of shifting the
probability distribution is disutility subtracted from the expected utility of the out-
comes. The disutility c(t) is assumed to be increasing and convex with c(0) = 0,
c(1) = u(M). In Section 2 we found the sufficient condition for comparing the
optimal t for F differing from G by a simple mean-preserving spread, that is, a mean-
preserving increase in risk satisfying the single crossing property. Here we generalize
this property to nth degree risk. We say that F differs from G by a simple increase
in nth degree risk if (i) F has more nth degree risk than G; and (ii) there exists
x0 ∈ [0,M ] such that Fn−1(x) ≥ Gn−1(x) for all x ≤ x0 and Fn−1(x) ≤ Gn−1(x) for
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all x ≥ x0.
Definition 2 u is more nth degree Arrow-Pratt risk averse than v if
− u
(n)(x)
u(n−1)(x)
≥ − v
(n)(x)
v(n−1)(x)
for all x ∈ [0,M ].
Proposition 3 Let u and v be nth and n − 1th degree risk averse, and let tu and tv
maximize U¯(t) =
∫M
0
u(x)dH(x, t)− c(t) and V¯ (t) = ∫M
0
v(x)dH(x, t)− c(t), respec-
tively. For any distribution function F which differs from G by a simple increase in
nth degree risk, tu ≥ tv if and only if u is more nth degree Arrow-Pratt risk averse
than v.
Proof. If: Rescale the utility function u so that u(n−1)(x0) = v(n−1)(x0). The solution
of U¯(t) maximization is the same as the solution from maximizing (−1)n U¯(t)
u(n−1)(x0)
. The
first-order condition yields
(−1)nEGu(x)− EFu(x)
u(n−1)(x0)
= (−1)n c
′(tu)
u(n−1)(x0)
(2.7)
Define
θ =
[
(−1)nEGu(x)− EFu(x)
u(n−1)(x0)
]
−
[
(−1)nEGv(x)− EFv(x)
v(n−1)(x0)
]
.
Integration by parts yields
θ =
∫ M
0
[
u(n−1)(x)
u(n−1)(x0)
− v
(n−1)(x)
v(n−1)(x0)
]
[Fn−1(x)−Gn−1(x)]dx.
Following an argument in Pratt [33], since u
(n)(x)
u(n−1)(x) =
d
dx
log u(n−1)(x), then from
u(n)(x)
u(n−1)(x) ≤ v
(n)(x)
v(n−1)(x) , integrating from x0 to x, we have log
u(n)(x)
u(n−1)(x) ≤ log v
(n)(x)
v(n−1)(x) ,
and hence u
(n−1)(x)
u(n−1)(x0)
≤ v(n−1)(x)
v(n−1)(x0)
, for all x ≥ x0. Similarly u(n−1)(x)u(n−1)(x0) ≥
v(n−1)(x)
v(n−1)(x0)
,
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for all x ≤ x0. Since Fn−1 and Gn−1 cross only once at x0, then θ ≥ 0. Since
u(n−1)(x0) = v(n−1)(x0), then c′(tu) ≥ c′(tv) and hence tu ≥ tv.
Only if: Suppose that there exists some x ∈ (0,M) such that − u(n)(x)
u(n−1)(x) <
− v(n)(x)
v(n−1)(x) . Because u ∈ C∞ there exists a neighborhood Z of x such that − u
(n)(z)
u(n−1)(z) <
− v(n)(z)
v(n−1)(z) for all z ∈ Z. Choose F and G such that Fn−1(z) − Gn−1(z) is a function
with support in Z, and F differs from G by a simple increase in nth degree risk
with a crossing at x0 = x. For all z ∈ Z such that z < x0, u(n)(z)u(n−1)(x0) <
v(n)(z)
v(n−1)(x0)
and Fn−1(z) > Gn−1(z).For all z ∈ Z such that z > x0, u(n)(z)u(n−1)(x0) >
v(n)(z)
v(n−1)(x0)
and
Fn−1(z) < Gn−1(z). Therefore θ < 0. It follows that tu < tv. ¤
When n = 2, Proposition 3 yields the same result as in Section 2, a more risk
averse agent chooses a larger value of t for any F that is a simple mean-preserving
spread of G. For n = 3, Kimball [22] defines the absolute prudence of agent u as
pu(x) = −u′′′(x)/u′′(x) to measure the strength of the precautionary saving motive.
We obtain the following results from the Proposition 3: if u and v are risk averse and
prudent, and F2 and G2 cross only once, then for any F having more downside risk
than G, tu ≥ tv if and only if pu(x) ≥ pv(x) for all x ∈ [0,M ].7
E. Conclusion
We characterize comparative measures of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk aversion through
a comparative statics problem. The Ross characterization arises when two risk averse
agents optimally choose their shifts in probability distribution toward a preferred
distribution that differs from the original one by a mean preserving decrease in risk,
and the cost of shifting probabilities is monetary. The Arrow-Pratt characterization
arises when the original distribution differs from the preferred distribution by a simple
7Chiu [12] shows that a more prudent individual invests in more self-protection
under certain circumstances.
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mean-preserving spread, and the cost is a utility cost.
Using the same approach, we generalize the comparative statics problem to the
difference in nth degree risk between two probability distributions and the nth degree
of risk aversion. For the third degree risk comparison in the monetary cost problem,
our characterization of more Ross risk averse in the third degree coincides with more
downside risk averse, as recently defined by Modica and Scarsini [30]. On the other
hand, in the utility cost problem, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measures in the 3rd
degree coincide with the absolute prudence measures defined by Kimball [22].
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CHAPTER III
OPTIMAL TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM
A. Introduction
Terrorist organizations use violent attacks, and the threat of further violent attacks,
to provoke fear and intimidation among the target population with the ultimate goal
of affecting policy change. In response to a threat of the terrorists, the government
of the target country may undertake some costly actions that help prevent attacks
or mitigate their severity. In this paper, the decisions of terrorism and counterter-
rorism are modeled in a two-person zero-sum game. The terrorists aim to minimize
the representative citizen’s expected utility, while the government maximizes it. The
strategic variable of the terrorists is the severity level of the attack, which is nega-
tively related to the probability of an attack because of resource constraints. The
government chooses an optimal level of an activity that mitigates the severity and/or
reduces the attack probability. The problem that the government faces is similar to
Ehrlich and Becker’s [17] self-insurance and self-protection problem.
We examine the effect of changes in the representative citizen’s degree of risk
aversion on the choice variables of the terrorists and the government. Then we find
an equilibrium of this game from the best response functions of both players when
the representative citizen is risk neutral, and then extend the result to the case of
risk aversion. We find that risk aversion increases the the terrorists’ choice of severity
and the government’s choice of mitigation, but does not always increase the level
of prevention. When the representative citizen is risk neutral, the terrorists always
choose the level of severity that maximizes the cost of counterterrorism activity and
does not depend on the nature of the action chosen by the government.
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In the next section, we discuss related literature in the economics of terrorism.
In Section 3 and 4, we analyze the effect of risk aversion on the terrorists’ and the
government’s strategies, respectively. We present the equilibrium of the game in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
B. Economics of Terrorism
Enders and Sandler [19] define terrorism as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of
extra-normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation
or fear directed at a large audience.” These political objectives of terrorists include
the promotion of religious freedoms, economic equality, income equality, income re-
distribution, nationalism, etc. The motive of the terrorist attacks can be explained
by Berry’s [3] theory of overreaction. Berry argues that terrorists can achieve their
political goal by weakening the government. Terrorists want the government to over-
react to the attack because when the government overreacts to the terrorist attack,
it weakens itself. Overreaction, for example, a very strict homeland security policy
resulting in a loss of liberty and privacy, can lessen public support and can be very
expensive. As a result, the choice of policy can be easily influenced.
The first economic analysis of terrorism is the study of Sandler, Tschirhart, and
Cauly [39]. Using interaction between government and terrorists who have their own
objective functions and constraints, Sandler et al examine the negotiation process
between government and terrorists when hostages are seized and demands are issued.
However, this negotiation model cannot explain bombings and assassinations which
are most incidents pursued by terrorists. Since there are strategies involved in terror-
ism and counterterrorism decisions, and each player’s payoff depends on the chosen
strategy of the other player, a game theoretical approach to the terrorism problem
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has recently received more attention.
Konrad [23] applies a simple game of extortion to the investment problem in
terrorism. Terrorists decide whether or not to invest in an attack, which is not
observed by government, before they use the threat of violence to pursue political or
monetary goals. The paper discusses the credibility of terrorist threats in a repeated
game but does not bring up any counterterrorism policy. On the other hand, there
are two papers that do focus on counterterrorism actions taken by target firms and
target governments. Kunreuther and Heal [24] examine the interdependent security
problem in which two target firms consider whether to invest in security precautions
whose effects depend on the actions of others. Sandler [38] studies a game in which
the two players are governments choosing whether to pursue preemption policy or
deterrence policy against terrorists. Since the threat of terrorism is global, the payoff
from the adopted policy depends on the policy adopted by another government.
A few other studies of counterterrorism aim to empirically investigate the impact
of enhanced security policy on terrorism. Cauley and Im [9] apply the intervention
analysis to the data on international terrorist events from 1968 to 1979 and find
that the installation of metal detectors has reduced the number of skyjackings but
increased other types of terrorist events. Enders and Sandler [20] suggest two appeal-
ing points based on a vector autoregressive analysis (VAR). First, terrorists try to
achieve a greater impact from fewer events. Despite a decline in terrorism since the
post-cold war era, each incident is more likely to result in death or injury. Second,
there is evidence that if the government responds by installing metal detectors, the
terrorists will substitute to less-protected targets with more deadly consequences.
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C. The Terrorist’s Decision in a World without Counterterrorism
The United States Code of Regulations defines terrorism as “...the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives.” The U.S. Department of Defense defines it as “the calculated use of
unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce
or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological.” Terrorist organizations use violent attacks, and
the threat of further violent attacks, to provoke fear and intimidation among the
target population with the ultimate goal of affecting policy change.
For example, purported political objectives behind al-Qaeda attacks against the
U.S. include ending the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, ending U.S. sup-
port of Israel, and ending U.S. support for corrupt regimes in the Muslim world
(Byman [6]). In this paper we focus on situations in which terrorists try to intimi-
date or coerce a democratically-elected government, because in those cases it makes
the most sense for the terrorists to target the population. After all, in a democratic
system, policy changes can occur when the electorate becomes dissatisfied with the
current policy choices.
To that end, suppose that the terrorist organization (referred to simply as the
terrorist in the remainder of the paper) believes that if a representative member of
the target population becomes sufficiently dissatisfied, a policy change is enacted.
The well-being of the representative citizen is measured by her expected utility. The
terrorist does not know how far the representative citizen’s expected utility must fall
before she votes for a policy change, and therefore uses his resources to minimize the
target citizen’s expected utility.
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Because fear and intimidation work only against those who are not the direct
victims of terrorist attacks, the threat of a future attack is the primary terrorism tool.
Like everyone else, the terrorist has limited resources to devote to the production of
fear. More severe attacks require more resources, and more frequent attacks require
more resources. Thus, the terrorist faces a tradeoff between the severity and the
frequency of attacks. This is reminiscent of Becker’s [2] classic treatment of a gov-
ernment choosing between the certainty and severity of punishment to deter crime.
Borrowing his terminology, the terrorist chooses the certainty and severity of an at-
tack in order to minimize the expected utility of a representative citizen in the target
country.
To capture the tradeoff induced by the terrorist’s limited resources, let p(s) be
the probability of attack that fully utilizes the terrorist’s resources when the chosen
severity of attack is s. Thus, p(s) describes a production possibility set for the
terrorist, and ps(s) < 0. There is a least severe attack that can be considered a
terrorist attack, and let s denote the least severe attack. Also, assume that there is
a most severe attack to which the representative citizen assigns positive probability,
and denote that level of severity by s¯. Then p(s¯) > 0, and let p = p(s¯) . Finally, let
p¯ = p(s) < 1. The production possibility frontier is shown in Figure 1.
The terrorist chooses a combination of certainty and severity to minimize the
expected utility of a representative citizen in the target country. Let her initial
wealth be w, and let u(·) be her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, with
u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0. Then her expected utility is given by
EU = (1− p(s))u(w) + p(s)u(w −D(s)), (3.1)
where D(s) captures the monetary equivalent of the damage caused by an attack of
severity s, with 0 < D(s) < w, Ds(s) > 0, and Dss(s) ≤ 0.
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Fig. 1. Optimal solution of the terrorist
In Figure 1, the terrorist chooses the point on the production possibilities frontier
that minimizes the representative citizen’s expected utility. To find the shape of
the terrorist’s (and the citizen’s) indifference curves, fix U¯ and let pi(s) satisfy (1 −
pi)u(w) + piu(w −D(s)) = U¯ . Then one can compute
dpi
ds
= − u(w)− U¯
[u(w)− u(w −D(s))]2 · u
′(w −D(s))Ds(s) < 0,
and
d2pi
ds2
=− u(w)− U¯
[u(w)− u(w −D(s))]2 · [(u
′(w −D(s))Dss(s)− u′′(w −D(s))(Ds(s))2)
− 2[u
′(w −D(s))(Ds(s))]2
u(w)− u(w −D(s)) ].
If the agent is risk neutral, then d2pi/ds2 > 0. Therefore, as long as the agent is not
too risk averse her iso-expected-utility curves in p− s space are convex, as in Figure
1.
The terrorist chooses s to minimize the agent’s expected utility. The first-order
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condition is
∂EU
∂s
= −ps(s)[u(w)− u(w −D(s))]− p(s)u′(w −D(s))Ds(s) = 0. (3.2)
The second-order condition of the terrorist’s minimization problem is
d2EU
ds2
=− pss(s)[u(w)− u(w −D(s))]− 2ps(s)u′(w −D(s))Ds(s)
+ p(s)[u′′(w −D(s))Ds(s))2 − u′(w −D(s))Dss(s)].
If the agent is risk neutral, we have
d2EU
ds2
= −u′(·)[pss(s)D(s) + 2ps(s)Ds(s) + p(s)Dss(s)] > 0.
Therefore if the representative citizen is not too risk averse the value of s that satis-
fies (3.2) minimizes the representative citizen’s expected utility. This is exactly the
intuition from the graphical approach.
Our first result concerns how the representative citizen’s risk attitudes affect the
choice made by the terrorist.
Proposition 4 The level of severity chosen by the terrorist is higher when the rep-
resentative citizen is more risk averse.
Proof. Let u and v be two utility functions with u a concave transformation of v.
Let su and sv be the values of s that satisfies the first-order condition (3.2) for the two
different utility functions. Rearrange the first-order condition for the utility function
v to get
ps(sv)D(sv) · v(w)− v(w −D(sv))
v′(w −D(sv))D(sv) + p(sv)Ds(sv) = 0. (3.3)
Normalize the two utility functions so that u(w−D(sv)) = v(w−D(sv)) = k > 0 and
u′(w−D(sv)) = v′(w−D(sv)) = 1. Define the function ρ to satisfy u(x) = ρ(v(x)) for
all x. Then by hypothesis ρ is concave, and by construction ρ′(k) = 1. Consequently,
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ρ′(z) ≤ 1 for all z > k. Now note that
u(w) = k +
∫ D(sv)
0
u′(w −D(sv) + t)dt
= k +
∫ D(sv)
0
ρ′(v(w −D(sv) + t)) · v′(w −D(sv) + t)dt
≤ k +
∫ D(sv)
0
v′(w −D(sv) + t)dt
= v(w),
and therefore, remembering that ps < 0,
ps(sv)D(sv) · u(w)− u(w −D(sv))
u′(w −D(sv))D(sv) + p(sv)Ds(sv) ≥ 0. (3.4)
Plugging (3.4) back into (3.2) yields ∂EU/∂s ≤ 0 at s = sv, and because ∂EU/∂s is
increasing in s and equal to zero at s = su, it follows that su ≥ sv. ¤
Thus, when compared with a risk neutral population, a risk averse population
in the target country leads terrorists to commit more damaging, but less frequent,
attacks.
This result is similar in spirit to Becker’s [2] observation that risk-averse expected-
utility-maximizing criminals are more sensitive to changes in the severity than cer-
tainty of punishment. Under these circumstances, in order to make a criminal worse
off in an attempt to deter him from committing a crime, the authorities should de-
crease the likelihood of capturing the criminal but increase the punishment if caught.
D. Optimal Counterterrorism
The analysis of the preceding section covered only part of the story. The government
of the target country is unlikely to sit idly under the threat of terrorist attacks.
Instead, the government can undertake costly actions that either help prevent attacks,
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mitigate their severity, or both. To that end, assume that the government can take
action a ≥ 0 to reduce the damage from and the probability of a successful attack.
Hence the level of damage and the probability of success are functions of both a and
s.
We assume that the representative citizen’s share of the cost of the action is
c(a), where c′(a) > 0 and c′′(a) > 0. The costs include the financial cost of the
action as well as costs associated with any possible loss of liberty and privacy to the
agent resulting from the chosen action. The government’s objective is to choose a to
maximize the representative citizen’s expected utility. In addition, we assume that
Da(a, s) ≤ 0, Daa(a, s) ≥ 0, pa(a, s) ≤ 0, paa(a, s) ≥ 0. These conditions say that
increases in a make a given attack both less likely to succeed and less damaging if
it does succeed, and that the impact of further increases in a diminishes as a rises.
Finally, D(a, s) > 0 and p(a, s) > 0 for all values of a and s, so that the government
can never completely eliminate the threat of terrorism.
The representative citizen’s expected utility can be written as
EU = (1− p(a, s))u(w − c(a)) + p(a, s)u(w −D(a, s)− c(a)). (3.5)
The government chooses a to maximize (3.5). The first-order condition is
∂EU
∂a
=− pa(a, s)[u(w − c(a))− u(w −D(a, s)− c(a)] (3.6)
− (1− p(a, s))u′(w − c(a))c′(a)
− p(a, s)u′(w −D(a, s)− c(a))[Da(a, s) + c′(a)] = 0.
If the agent is risk neutral, then the first-order condition becomes
−[pa(a, s)D(a, s) + p(a, s)Da(a, s)] = c′(a), (3.7)
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which has the standard interpretation that the marginal benefit of the counterterror-
ism activity equals the marginal cost.
Differentiating the government’s objective function a second time yields
∂2EU
∂a2
=− paa(a, s)[u(w − c(a))− u(w −D(a, s)− c(a)]
+ 2pa(a, s)[u
′(w − c(a))c′(a)− u(w −D(a, s)− c(a))(Da(a, s) + c′(a)]
+ (1− p(a, s))[u′′(w − c(a))(c′(a))2 − u′(w − c(a))c′′(a)]
+ p(a, s)[u′′(w −D(a, s)− c(a))(Da(a, s) + c′(a))2
− u′(w −D(a, s)− c(a))(Daa(a, s) + c′′(a))].
If the representative agent is risk neutral, we have
∂2EU
∂a2
= −u′(·)[paa(a, s)D(a, s) + 2pa(a, s)Da(a, s) + p(a, s)Daa(a, s) + c′′(a)] < 0.
Therefore if the representative citizen is not too risk averse the second-order condition
for a maximum is satisfied.
The government’s problem is analogous to the self-insurance and self-protection
problem introduced by Ehrlich and Becker [17]. The mitigation of the damage from
terrorism and the reduction in the probability of a successful attack are analogous to
self-insurance and self-protection, respectively. Dionne and Eeckhoudt [15] and Briys
and Schlesinger [5] show that an increase in risk aversion increases the optimal level of
self-insurance, but does not always increase the optimal investment in self-protection.
We say that the government’s action is purely mitigating if it affects the damages
D but not the success probability p, that is, Da(a, s) < 0 but pa(a, s) = 0. In
contrast, the action is purely preventive if it affects the success probability p but not
the damages D. We now treat the two cases separately.
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1. Mitigating activities
In this subsection assume that the action a affects only the level of damages from
an attack but not the probability of success. In particular, assume that D(a, s) =
g(a)D(s), with g′(a) ≤ 0, g′′(a) ≥ 0, and p(a, s) = p(s). Under these circumstances,
the first-order condition (3.6) can be written
− [g
′(a)D(s) + c′(a)]p(s)
c′(a)(1− p(s)) =
u′(w − c(a))
u′(w − g(a)D(s)− c(a) . (3.8)
Proposition 5 Assume that the government’s action is purely mitigating. The level
of counterterrorism activity chosen by the government rises when the representative
agent becomes more risk averse.
Proof. By Pratt [33], when the representative citizen becomes more risk averse, the
right-hand side of (3.8) falls. Differentiating the left-hand side by a yields
∂LHS
∂a
= − [c
′(a)g′′(a)− c′′(a)g′(a)]D(s)p(s)
(c′(a))2(1− p(s)) ≤ 0.
Therefore, when the representative citizen becomes more risk averse, a must increase
to maintain equality in (3.8). ¤
Proposition 5 states that increased risk aversion leads to increased counterter-
rorism activities when those activities mitigate the damages of an attack but do not
prevent an attack. It is reminiscent of existing results that increased risk aversion
leads to increased self-insurance. The intuition behind the result is that by increasing
the mitigating activity the government increases the representative citizen’s payoff in
the bad state (an attack occurs) but reduces it in the good state (no attack). When
the representative citizen becomes more risk averse, the government desires the two
payoff levels to be closer together, which it achieves by spending more on mitigating
the damages from an attack.
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2. Preventive activities
Now assume that the government’s actions affect only the attack’s success probability
and not the extent of damages. In particular, assume that D(a, s) = D(s) and
p(a, s) = f(a)p(s) with f ′(a) ≤ 0, f ′′(a) ≥ 0. Now the first-order condition in (3.6)
reduces to
∂EU
∂a
=− f ′(a)p(s)[u(w − c(a))− u(w −D(s)− c(a)]
− (1− f(a)p(s))u′(w − c(a))c′(a)
− f(a)p(s)u′(w −D(s)− c(a))c′(a) = 0.
This can be rearranged to get
− c
′(a)
f ′(a)p(s)
=
u(w − c(a))− u(w −D(s)− c(a))
(1− f(a)p(s))u′(w − c(a)) + f(a)p(s)u′(w −D(s)− c(a)) . (3.9)
Proposition 6 Assume that the government’s action is purely preventive. If the
probability of attack is sufficiently low, the level of counterterrorism activity chosen
by the government rises when the representative agent becomes more risk averse.
Proof. Consider two utility functions u and v with u more risk averse than v. Fix
s, and let av be the value that maximizes v’s expected utility. Assume, without loss
of generality, that u(w − c(av)) = v(w − c(av)) = 1 and that u(w −D(s) − c(av)) =
v(w − D(s) − c(av)) = 0. Furthermore, because u is a concave transformation of v,
u′(w −D(s)− c(av)) ≥ v′(w −D(s)− c(av)) ≥ v′(w − c(av)) ≥ u′(w − c(av)). Then
there exists p∗ such that
(1−p∗)u′(w−c(av))+p∗u′(w−D(s)−c(av)) = (1−p∗)v′(w−c(av))+p∗v′(w−D(s)−c(av)),
and for any p < p∗,
(1−p)u′(w−c(av))+pu′(w−D(s)−c(av)) ≤ (1−p)v′(w−c(av))+pv′(w−D(s)−c(av)).
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Consequently, if p(s) is so low that f(av)p(s) < p
∗ then
u(w − c(av))− u(w −D(s)− c(av))
(1− f(av)p(s))u′(w − c(av)) + f(av)p(s)u′(w −D(s)− c(av)) ≥
v(w − c(av))− v(w −D(s)− c(av))
(1− f(av)p(s))v′(w − c(av)) + f(av)p(s)v′(w −D(s)− c(av)) .
Therefore, when p(s) is sufficiently small, the increase in risk aversion from v to u
makes the right-hand side of equation (3.9) rise. The left-hand side of (3.9) increases
in a because both c and f are convex, and it follows that au ≥ av. ¤
Proposition 6 states that if an attack is not too likely, when the representative
citizen becomes more risk averse the government spends more to prevent an attack.
Intuitively, when an attack is not too likely, expected marginal utility of income is
closer to u′(w− c(a)) than to u′(w−D(s)− c(a)), and the former is smaller than the
latter. An increase in risk aversion makes the utility function more concave, which
increases marginal utility close to the left endpoint of the interval [w−D(s)−c(a), w−
c(a)] and decreases marginal utility near the right endpoint. When the probability
of attack is small, expected marginal utility decreases as the citizen becomes more
risk averse. Because the citizen values income less, the government finds it optimal
to spend more of the income on preventing terrorism attacks.
Conversely, if the probability of attack is high, an increase in risk aversion
increases expected marginal utility of income, and the government spends less on
preventing attacks. The ambiguity of the result is consistent with the findings of
Dionne and Eeckhoudt [15] and Briys and Schlesinger [5] that the optimal level of
self-protection may or may not increase with risk aversion.
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E. Equilibrium Terrorism and Counterterrorism
This section contains our primary results, which concern the equilibrium of the game
between the terrorist organization and the target government. In light of the results
of Sections 3 and 4, we can begin the analysis with the risk neutral case and then use
Propositions 1 through 3 to discuss how the equilibrium behavior changes when the
representative citizen becomes risk averse.
In Section 4 we found that the impact of increased risk aversion on the govern-
ment’s choice of the level of counterterrorism activity depends on the nature of that
activity. In particular, the direction of the effect is unambiguous if the activity is
purely mitigating but ambiguous if the activity is purely preventive. To aid in the
identification of the counterterrorism activity into one of these two categories, we as-
sume that the probability-of-attack function p(a, s) and the damage function D(a, s)
are both multiplicatively separable:
p(a, s) = f(a)m(s),
and
D(a, s) = g(a)n(s),
where f and g are decreasing and convex, m is decreasing and concave, and n is
increasing and concave. If f ′ < 0 but g′ = 0 the counterterrorism activity is purely
preventive, but if g′ < 0 and f ′ = 0 it is purely mitigating.
Begin with the terrorist’s decision. When the representative citizen is risk neu-
tral, the first-order condition from Section 3 becomes
p(a, s)Ds(a, s) + ps(a, s)D(a, s) = 0,
which implicitly defines the terrorist’s best-response function s∗(a). As the next
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proposition shows, in the risk-neutral case the terrorist’s best-response function is
single-valued.
Proposition 7 Assume that the representative citizen is risk neutral and the probability-
of-attack function p(a, s) and the damage function D(a, s) can be written as f(a)m(s)
and g(a)n(s), respectively. Then the terrorist organization has a dominant strategy,
that is, the severity level it chooses does not depend on the action chosen by the
government.
Proof. The first-order condition of the terrorists can be written as
f(a)g(a)[m′(s)n(s) +m(s)n′(s)] = 0
Implicitly differentiating with respect to a and rearranging yields
ds∗
da
= − (f
′g + fg′)(mn′ +m′n)
fg(m′′n+ 2m′n′ +mn′′)
and the numerator is zero by the first-order condition. ¤
The result that the terrorist’s activities are independent of the government’s
attempts to combat them is surprising. After all, if the government undertakes purely
mitigating activities, for example, thereby raising the price of severity, one would
expect the terrorists to respond by “purchasing” more certainty and less severity.
Proposition 7 shows that this is not the case when the representative citizen of the
target country is risk neutral. Instead, the terrorists choose the same severity level,
call it s∗, no matter what the target government does.
Turning attention to the target government’s decision, when the representative
citizen is risk neutral the first-order condition is given by equation (3.7). The next
proposition describes the shape of the government’s best-response function.
Proposition 8 Assume that the representative citizen is risk neutral and the probability-
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of-attack function p(a, s) and the damage function D(a, s) can be written as f(a)m(s)
and g(a)n(s), respectively. Then the government’s best-response function a∗(s) is in-
creasing when s < s∗ and decreasing when s > s∗.
Proof. Implicitly differentiating (3.7) with respect to s and rearranging yields
da∗
ds
= − (f
′g + fg′)(mn′ +m′n)
c′′ +mn(f ′′g + 2f ′g′ + fg′′)
(3.10)
The terrorist organization chooses s to minimize
EU(a, s) = w − p(a, s)D(a, s) = w − f(a)m(s)g(a)n(s).
Then ∂EU(a, s)/∂s = −fg[m′n+mn′], and by the second-order condition for a
minimum, m′n+mn′ > 0 when s < s∗ and m′n+mn′ < 0 when s > s∗. The second-
order condition also guarantees that the denominator of (3.10) is positive, and so the
sign of da∗/ds is the opposite of the sign of the numerator of (3.10). Finally note
that, by construction, f ′ and g′ are both negative, and so da∗/ds has the same sign
as m′n+mn′. ¤
Figure 2 shows the best-response curves for the multiplicatively-separable risk
neutral case described in Propositions 7 and 8. The terrorist organization’s best-
response curve is vertical, consistent with the dominant strategy found in Proposi-
tion 7. The target government’s best-response curve is hump-shaped, and the Nash
equilibrium of the game lies at the intersection of the two curves.
As shown in the figure, in equilibrium the terrorist chooses the level of severity
that provokes the highest level of counterterrorism activity. At first glance this may
seem counterintuitive. After all, if the terrorist wants the attacks to succeed, why
would they try to generate a large amount of counterterrorist activity? The answer
lies in the nature of the terrorist organization’s objective function. The goal of the
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Fig. 2. Best response functions when the representative agent is risk neutral
terrorist is to make the representative citizen as poorly off as possible, and this can
be achieved either through the threat of attack or by making the citizen bare a large
counterterrorism burden.
The impact of risk aversion on the levels of terrorism and counterterrorism ac-
tivities can now be easily derived using the results of Propositions 4 through 8. By
Proposition 4, when the representative citizen becomes risk averse the terrorist’s best
response curve shifts rightward, and therefore risk aversion leads to more severe, but
less likely attacks (holding the government’s response fixed). By Propositions 5 and
6, if counterterrorism is purely mitigating or if it is purely preventive but attacks are
sufficiently unlikely, risk aversion causes the government’s best-response curve to shift
upward. Because the risk-neutral equilibrium was at the peak of the government’s
best-response curve, however, the effect of risk aversion on the level of counterter-
rorism is ambiguous in this case, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 3. If, on the other
hand, counterterrorism is purely preventive and attacks are sufficiently likely, risk
aversion causes the government’s best-response curve to shift downward, in which
case risk aversion unambiguously causes the level of severity to rise and the level of
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Fig. 3. Best response functions when the representative agent is risk averse
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counterterrorism activity to fall, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.
F. Conclusion
We analyze decisions made by a group of terrorists and a government in a zero-sum
game where the terrorists minimize a representative citizen’s expected utility and the
government maximizes it. The terrorists’ strategy balances the probability and the
severity of the attack while the government chooses the level of investment reducing
the probability and/or mitigating the severity. We find that, if the representative
agent is risk neutral, the terrorists choose the level of severity that does not depend
on the government’s choice of activities, but provokes the highest level of counterter-
rorism activity. We also find that the citizen’s risk attitudes affect the strategies of
the terrorists and the government. When compared with a risk neutral population,
a risk averse population in the target country leads the terrorists to commit more
damaging, but less frequent, attacks.
When the government’s activities mitigate the damages of an attack but do
not prevent an attack, increased risk aversion leads to increased counterterrorism
activities. However, when the government’s activities only prevent an attack but do
not mitigate the damages, the effect of risk aversion on the counterterrorism activities
depends on the probability of an attack. If an attack is not too likely, the government
spends more to prevent an attack when the representative citizen becomes more risk
averse. If an attack is likely, then the government spends less to prevent an attack
when the representative citizen becomes more risk averse.
36
CHAPTER IV
A RISK ANALYSIS OF EX-ANTE WILLINGNESS TO PAY
A. Introduction
Consider a situation in which an individual has to pay for a good before he knows
whether or not he will consume the good in the future, or before he realizes the true
surplus of consuming the good. If the surplus depends on the state of nature which
is unknown at the moment, what will be his ex-ante willingness to pay for this good?
This ex-ante willingness to pay is called the option price because it can be thought
of the price for an option to consume this good in the future.
Ex-ante welfare measures are important. For example, Presidential executive
orders and federal regulations urge policy makers to consider benefits and costs of
various policy programs that involve risks and unknowns. If policy makers collect
information on the wrong set of ex-ante welfare measures, then programs will not
reflect social desires, let alone be in any sense efficient. The concept of option price
has received much attention since Graham [21] adopted it in cost-benefit analysis and
suggested that the option price is an appropriate welfare measure for a public good
under uninsurable risk. Following Graham’s framework, economists have used the
option price as an ex-ante measure of benefits in several health and environmental
studies.1
Cicchetti and Freeman [14] show that an option price exists for a private good
in a market of a perfectly discriminating monopolist who sells options for the good in
advance by charging each individual his willingness to pay. For example, if there are
two states of nature, a sunny or a rainy day, and a perfectly discriminating monopolist
1For example, Smith and Devousges [45]; Cameron [8]; Riddel and Shaw [35].
37
knows each individual’s willingness to pay for a baseball ticket for a game in each
weather condition, the option price is the willingness to pay for the ticket when it is
sold in advance–the true state is not yet known. If the individual does not buy the
ticket in advance, on the game day he will be charged the willingness to pay given that
it shines or it rains. Specifically, the monopolist knows both the ex-ante willingness to
pay (or the option price) and the ex-post surplus in each state. It is possible that the
individual’s option price is greater or less than the expected surplus. The difference
between the option price and the expected surplus has been called option value.
Even though the appropriate ex-ante benefit measure is the option price, the
option value may play a crucial role in a cost-benefit analysis. Smith [44] suggests
that it is possible that expected surplus might be measured more easily than option
price and one can use option value in order to gauge the error in using expected
surplus in an ex-ante analysis. Cicchetti and Freeman[14] state that the option value
is an individual’s risk premium, and thus it is positive for any risk-averse agent. Even
though the latter part of the statement has been proved to be wrong by showing that
the option value can take either a positive or a negative sign (see Schmalensee [40]
and Graham [21]), no one to my knowledge has demonstrated how the option value
and the risk premium are related.
It is obvious that the option value cannot equal the risk premium because a risk-
averse agent must have a nonnegative risk premium, but may have a negative option
value. Nonetheless, economists still use Cicchetti and Freeman’s interpretation of
the option value (for example, Chavas and Mullarkey [10] p.23-24). In this paper, I
examine the relationship between the option value and the risk premium by applying
a methodology suggested by Nau [31] to Graham’s model of option price and option
value. I find that the option value actually is similar to Nau’s buying price for a fixed
payment of the expected surplus, and there is a special case where the option value
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is a negative of the compensating risk premium.
Another goal of this paper is to relax the expected utility assumption in Graham’s
model. Since many experiments show that individual behavior does not always agree
with the independence axiom of expected utility theory, it is important to determine
how the option price and the option value change when one assumes a nonexpected
utility theory rather than the conventional expected utility theory. I find that if
an expected utility maximizer and a rank-dependent expected utility agent who is
pessimistic have the same state-dependent surplus for a good, the pessimistic agent’s
option value is larger in magnitude.
In the next section, I discuss how the option value is related to the risk premium.
In Section 3, I generalize Graham’s model to rank-dependent expected utility. I
conclude in Section 4.
B. The Relationship between Risk Premium and Option Value
1. Background
Weisbrod [48] introduces the concept of option demand in a classic example, the
willingness to pay for preserving a national park that an individual may or may not
visit in the future. Cicchetti and Freeman [14] formulate the option demand in a
problem of two periods. First an individual decides whether to buy an option to
consume a good, and later, learns whether he demands the good. Cicchetti and
Freeman define option price as the willingness to pay for the option, and define
option value as the difference between the option price and the expected surplus.
They interpret the option value as a risk premium and suggest that it is nonnegative
for a risk-averse person.
Assuming expected utility theory, Schmalensee [40] defines option price as the
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maximum amount an individual is willing to pay with certainty to guarantee that a
preferred price system will prevail in all states of nature. Let P and P∗ denote two
price systems where P is preferred to P∗. Assume that there are n states of nature,
and the probability that state i occurs is pi. Let wi and ui denote income and utility
function in state i, respectively. The option price, T , is defined by
n∑
i=1
piui(wi − T,P) =
n∑
i=1
piui(wi,P
∗).
If si denotes the consumer’s surplus (the Hicksian compensating variation) in state i,
then
ui(wi − si,P) = ui(wi,P∗).
Similar to Cicchetti and Freeman’s definition of option value, Schmalensee’s option
value, t, is defined by
t = T −
n∑
i=1
pisi.
Schmalensee argues that the option value can be positive or negative for a risk-averse
agent.
Graham [21] adopts Schmalensee’s model for cost-benefit analyses. If u∗i (wi) and
ui(wi) are utility levels of income wi when a good (or a public project) is unavailable
and available, respectively, then the willingness to pay for such a good in state i, si,
satisfies this condition:
ui(wi − si) = u∗i (wi).
Let p = [p1, . . . , pn] be a vector of probabilities, w = [w1, . . . , wn] be a vector
of income levels, and s = [s1, . . . , sn] be a vector of surplus levels. Let u[w] =
[u1(w1), . . . , un(wn)] be a utility vector. The expected surplus of the good is then
Ep(s), and denote the (state-dependent) expected utility of the income vector w by
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U(w). Let 1 be a unit vector. The option price given the surplus vector T (s) satisfies
U(w− s) = Ep(u[w− s]) = Ep(u[w− T (s)1]). (4.1)
Since the sign of the option value (or risk premium as interpreted by Cicchetti
and Freeman) is ambiguous, the role of risk premia in the ex-ante payment problem
deserves further explanation. If the option value is akin to the risk premium, how
can a risk averse agent have a negative risk premium? After Cicchetti and Freeman’s
exposition, no other paper has explicitly discussed this matter. 2
Kimball [22] calls the premium that an agent is willing to pay for avoiding a zero-
mean risk an equivalent risk premium, and the premium that an agent requires as a
compensation for bearing a zero-mean risk a compensating risk premium.3 Nau [31]
generalizes Kimball’s framework to allow for state-dependent utility and derives a
selling risk premium and a buying risk premium that relate to Kimball’s equivalent
risk premium and compensating risk premium, respectively. However, in his article,
Nau uses the buying risk premium rather than the selling risk premium in measuring
local risk aversion because it directly measures the local quasi-concavity of utility.
Nau defines a risk-neutral probability distribution, a buying price and a buying
risk premium as follow. The normalized gradient of U at wealth w, which is known
as the risk-neutral probability distribution, is defined as
q(w) =
∇U(w)
‖∇U(w)‖ ,
where ‖ · ‖ is the L1 norm. The buying price for a risky asset z, denoted B(z), is
2Schlee and Schlesinger [41] show a similarity between risk premium and option
price for accessing a contingent claim market.
3Pratt’s [33] risk premium is the equivalent risk premium.
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determined by
Ep(u[w+ z−B(z)1]) = Ep(u[w]).
In the above expression, if B(z)1 is instead added in the brackets in the right hand
side, B(z) would be interpreted as the certainty equivalent for the asset z. Finally,
the buying risk premium for the asset z, b(z), is defined by
b(z) = Eq(w)(z)−B(z).
Nau adopts Yarri’s [49] definition of risk aversion, specifically, a risk-averse in-
dividual has preferences that are payoff-convex.4 He concludes that the individual is
risk averse if and only if the buying risk premium is nonnegative for every asset at
every wealth distribution. In the ex-ante payment problem, I also use the buying risk
premium in the analysis because it fits the situation better than the selling risk pre-
mium. Specifically, the individual is assumed to pay a constant payment in advance
and he is asked how much he needs to be compensated to make him indifferent to
when he pays the state-dependent surplus.
2. Results
I assume that the utility function ui is twice differentiable. In this paper, I follow
Nau’s [31] approach in identifying buying price and risk premium, but slightly change
notations as follows. The risk-neutral probability distribution at surplus s, is defined
as
q(s) =
∇U(w− s)
‖∇U(w− s)‖ .
4The preference relation % is payoff-convex if x % z and y % z imply αx + (1 −
α)y % z for α ∈ (0, 1).
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For some payment vector y, if an individual’s payment vector is changed from s to
y, then his buying price for this change, denoted B(y), is determined by
Ep(u[w− y−B(y)1]) = Ep(u[w− s]). (4.2)
The buying risk premium for the change from s to y is defined by
b(y) = Eq(s)(s− y)−B(y). (4.3)
In the ex-ante payment problem, I assume that initially an individual must pay
the state-dependent surplus for a good, represented by the payment vector s. Then
the problem is changed so that the individual is assumed to pay the constant amount
Ep(s) before he knows the state of nature. Defining s¯ = Ep(s)1, this is equivalent to
saying that the individual’s payment vector has been changed from s to s¯, which might
increase or decrease the individual’s expected utility from the initial position. To keep
this individual’s expected utility unchanged, the individual must pay a buying price
in addition to the constant amount Ep(s). Proposition 1 describes how the option
value is related to the buying price.
Proposition 9 The option value is equal to the buying price for changing the pay-
ment from s to s¯, i.e., t(s) = B(s¯).
Proof. Equating (4.1) and (4.2) yields:
Ep(u[w− T (s)1]) = Ep(u[w− y−B(y)1]).
Let y = s¯. Then, T (s) = Ep(s) +B(s¯), and therefore B(s¯) = t(s). ¤
Following Graham’s [21] approach, Proposition 9 can be illustrated in the 2-state
payment space in Figures 4 and 5. For example, assume that the state is determined
by the individual’s health, with 1 for sick and 2 for healthy. For simplicity, let
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Fig. 4. Willingness-to-pay locus for a hospital (s1 > s2)
w1 = w2 = w. Based on a previous survey by Viscusi and Evans [47], u
′
1(w) < u
′
2(w)
for all w. If the good in this problem is a hospital or a health care service, we should
expect that s1 > s2. The willingness-to-pay locus (x1, x2), defined by
p1u1(w − x1) + p2u2(w − x2) = p1u1(w − s1) + p2u2(w − s2),
is shown in Figure 4. Along the willingness-to-pay locus, ∂x2
∂x1
= − p
1−p · u
′
1(w1−x1)
u′2(w2−x2) , and
∂2x2
∂x21
= p
1−p · u
′′
1 (w1−x1)
u′2(w2−x2) . Any payment in the upper contour set (between the willingness-
to-pay locus and the origin) is preferred to the willingness-to-pay locus. The expected
surplus and the option price denoted Ep(s) and T (s) yield a negative option value.
In Figure 5 the good is a sport facility in which I assume that s1 < s2. In this case,
the option value is positive. The sign of the option value can be explained by Nau’s
buying price. In the hospital example, s % s¯ and the individual must be compensated
by a positive amount of money if he has to pay s¯. Therefore the buying price (or the
option value) must be negative. In the sport facility example, s¯ % s, the individual’s
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Fig. 5. Willingness-to-pay locus for a sport facility (s1 < s2)
expected utility would increase if he did not pay for this change. To keep his expected
utility unchanged, the buying price must be positive. In both cases, the risk premia,
Eq(s)(s)− T (s), are positive.
From Proposition 9, it is clear that the option value should not be interpreted
as a risk premium. However, there is a special case where the option value can be
derived directly from the buying risk premium. To get the result, following Graham’s
definition, I define the fair-bet payment of surplus s, f(s), as a vector x that maximizes
Ep(x) subject to Ep(u[w− x]) = Ep(u[w− s]). If f(s) = [f1, . . . , fn], then from the
maximization problem, u′i(wi − fi) = u′j(wj − fj) for all i, j = 1, . . . , n. The surplus
vector is a fair-bet vector of itself when s = f(s).
Proposition 10 Assume that the surplus vector is a fair-bet vector of itself. The
option value is the negative of the risk premium, i.e., t(s) = −b(s¯), and the individual
is risk averse if and only if t(s) ≤ 0.
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Proof. Let z = s − s¯. If s = f(s), then Eq(s)(z) = Ep(z) = 0. Hence, from
(4.3), b(s¯) = −B(s¯). The second part of the proposition follows immediately from
Proposition 1 in Nau [31]. ¤
Now I assume that s = f(s). The result can be illustrated in Figure 6. The
option value is T (s)−Ep(s) which is negative, and the risk premium is Ep(s)−T (s).
C. Rank-Dependent Expected Utility
1. Background
Economists and psychologists agree that individuals tend to substitute decision weights
for probabilities so that expected utility theory cannot always explain individuals’
behavior. An appropriate utility theory that embodies probability transformation
without violating the first-order stochastic dominance is a rank-dependent expected
utility proposed by Quiggin [34]. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) and, without loss of generality,
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x1 < . . . < xn. The rank-dependent expected utility function is given by
V (x;p) = h(p1)u(x1) +
n∑
i=2
[
h(
i∑
j=1
pj)− h(
i−1∑
j=1
pj)
]
u(xi), (4.4)
where h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a probability transformation function with h(0) = 0,
h(1) = 1, and h′ ≥ 0. Tversky and Kahneman [46] suggest a single parameterized
form of the probability transformation function,
h(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1). With certain values of the parameter, one obtains the popular
inverted-S weighting function which implies that the individual overweights extreme
outcomes with small probabilities. As a result, the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes,
risk-seeking for small-probability gains and large-probability losses, and risk aversion
for small-probability losses and large-probability gains, can be explained.
2. Results
First I assume that expected utility (EU) theory holds. There are two states and the
utility function is the same in both states, but income varies. Assume throughout this
section that w1 < w2 and surplus si depends on wi, for i = 1, 2, with 0 ≤ w1 − s1 ≤
w2 − s2. This is a special case of state-dependent utility. Therefore the option value
is the buying price in the sense of Nau [31]. The fair-bet payment in this case is the
vector f such that w1 − f1 = w2 − f2. Changing the payment vector from s = f to s¯
is an increase in risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz [37]. Therefore s % s¯ and
the option value t(s) is negative.
Two other interesting cases are a normal good and an inferior good. For a
normal good, s1 ≤ s2, and paying the expected surplus is an increase in risk. Thus
the option value is negative. In contrast, for an inferior good, s1 ≥ s2, paying the
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expected surplus is an increase in risk and the option value is positive. These results
are illustrated in Figure 7. The payment vectors s1 and s2 are the surplus vectors of
a normal good and an inferior good, respectively. Both goods have the same option
price (T ). The option values t(s1) is negative and t(s2) is positive.
Now let the agent be a rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) maximizer, and
the probabilities that the wealth level is w1 and w2 are p and (1 − p), respectively.
Then (4.4) can be written as
V (w1, w2; p) = h(p)u(w1) + [1− h(p)]u(w2). (4.5)
If h(p) > p, the individual overweights the lower outcome, and the individual is said
to be pessimistic. If h(p) < p, the individual overweights the higher outcome, and the
individual is said to be optimistic (see also Quiggin [34] and Neilson [32]). Suppose
that two agents, an EU agent and a RDEU agent have the same surplus. Who has a
higher option value?
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Proposition 11 If an EU agent and a pessimistic (an optimistic) agent have the
same surplus, then the pessimistic (optimistic) agent’s option value is larger (smaller)
in magnitude.
Proof. Define u(s1, s2) = pu(w1− s1)+ (1− p)u(w2− s2) and v(s1, s2) = h(p)u(w1−
s1) + (1 − h(p))u(w2 − s2) so that u is an EU agent and v is a pessimistic agent.
Since w1 − s1 < w2 − s2 and h(p) > p, then u(s1, s2) > v(s1, s2). Let Tu and
Tv be the option price of agent u and v, respectively. Then u(s1, s2) = u(Tu, Tu)
and v(s1, s2) = v(Tv, Tv) ≡ v¯. Hence u(Tv, Tv) > v(Tv, Tv). We have the following
equations.
u(s1, s2)− v¯ = [h(p)− p][u(w2 − s2)− u(w1 − s1)] (4.6)
u(Tv, Tv)− v¯ = [h(p)− p][u(w2 − Tv)− u(w1 − Tv)] (4.7)
Let g(x1) be a continuous function such that v(x1, g(x1)) = v¯. We know that
dg(x1)
dx1
<
0. Hence d
dx1
[u(w2 − g(x1))− u(w1 − x1)] > 0. If the good is normal for both agents,
i.e., s2 > s1, then Tv > s1 and the RHS of (4.7) is greater than the RHS of (4.6).
Therefore u(Tv, Tv) > u(s1, s2) = u(Tu, Tu), and Tv < Tu. Since the good is normal
for both agents, Tv < Tu < E(s). Let tu and tv be the option value of agent u and v,
respectively, it follows that tv < tu < 0. Similarly, if the good is inferior, tv > tu > 0.
In either case, |tv| > |tu|. If the agent is optimistic, then h(p) > p and the signs are
reversed. ¤
Fix the level of the RDEU at v¯ = h(p)u(w1 − s1) + [1 − h(p)]u(w2 − s2). The
willingness-to-pay locus (x1, x2) for a RDEU agent is derived from
v¯ =
 h(p)u(w1 − x1) + [1− h(p)]u(w2 − x2) if w1 − x1 ≤ w2 − x2;h(1− p)u(w2 − x2) + [1− h(1− p)]u(w1 − x1) if w1 − x1 > w2 − x2.
The willingness-to-pay locus now has a kink at (k1, k2), where w1 − k1 = w2 − k2.
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Fig. 8. Willingness-to-pay locus of the RDEU agent
Along the willingness-to-pay locus, ∂x2
∂x1
= − h(p)
1−h(p) ·u
′(w1−x1)
u′(w2−x2) and
∂2x2
∂x21
= h(p)
1−h(p) ·u
′′(w1−x1)
u′(w2−x2)
when x1 ≥ k1; and ∂x2∂x1 = −
1−h(1−p)
h(1−p) · u
′(w1−x1)
u′(w2−x2) and
∂2x2
∂x21
= 1−h(1−p)
h(1−p) · u
′′(w1−x1)
u′(w2−x2) when
x1 < k1. If I assume that the surplus of a normal good for the RDEU agent is the
same as for the EU agent, the RDEU willingness-to-pay locus is the bold curve with a
kink at k crossing the EU willingness-to-pay locus at s as shown in Figure 8. This is
similar to the kink on a indifference curve of an individual who is risk averse of order
1 defined by Segal and Spivak [42].5 Segal and Spivak [43] prove that the first-order
risk aversion at k is equivalent to the local utility function that is not differentiable
at k.
The result described above is based on state-independent utility, while Graham’s
model is based on state-dependent utility. To apply the RDEU assumption to a state-
dependent utility, I follow Chiu’s methodology. Chiu [11] ranks the prospective out-
5For a random variable ε with E(ε) = 0. Let µ(tε) be the risk premium that the
agent is willing to pay to avoid the risk tε. The agent is risk averse of order 1 if
∂µ(tε)/∂t|t=0 6= 0.
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comes according to their state-dependent utility levels instead of their state-dependent
income levels. Now assume that there are two states of nature, u1(w) < u2(w) for all
w1 = w2 = w, and u1(w1−s1) ≤ u2(w2−s2). If the utility function is state-dependent,
the RDEU can be written as
W (w1, w2; p) = h(p)u1(w1) + [1− h(p)]u2(w2), (4.8)
where u1(w1) < u2(w2). Fix the level of the RDEU at w¯ = h(p)u1(w1 − s1) + [1 −
h(p)]u2(w2 − s2). The willingness-to-pay locus (x1, x2) is derived from
w¯ =
 h(p)u1(w1 − x1) + [1− h(p)]u2(w2 − x2) if u1(w1 − x1) ≤ u2(w2 − x2);h(1− p)u2(w2 − x2) + [1− h(1− p)]u1(w1 − x1) if u1(w1 − x1) > u2(w2 − x2).
Let (k1, k2) be a payment vector on the willingness-to-pay locus such that u1(w1−
k1) = u2(w2 − k2). If w1 < w2, then k1 < k2. The analysis is similar to the state-
independent case (see Figure 8), except that with state-dependent utility, k1 may be
negative.
D. Conclusion
The option price is the ex-ante willingness to pay for a good whose surplus is depen-
dent on state of nature. The difference between the option price and the expected
surplus is called option value. The option price has been used as an appropriate
welfare measure under risk under the assumption of expected utility, while the option
value has been interpreted as the risk premium. This interpretation is arguable since
the option value can be positive or negative, but the risk premium must be positive
for a risk-averse agent. I show that actually the option value is the buying price for
changing the payment from the state-dependent surplus to the expected surplus, and
it can be positive or negative.
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I also show that Graham’s model can be generalized to rank-dependent expected
utility. When there are two states of nature and two agents, an EU agent and a
pessimistic agent. If both have the same surplus, then the pessimistic agent’s option
value is larger in magnitude. In contrast, if an EU agent and an optimistic agent have
the same surplus, then the optimistic agent’s option value is smaller in magnitude.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
In Chapter II, we characterize comparative measures of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk
aversion through a comparative statics problem. The Ross characterization arises
when two risk averse agents optimally choose their shifts in probability distribution
toward a preferred distribution that differs from the original one by a mean preserving
decrease in risk, and the cost of shifting probabilities is monetary. The Arrow-Pratt
characterization arises when the original distribution differs from the preferred dis-
tribution by a simple mean-preserving spread, and the cost is a utility cost.
Using the same approach, we generalize the comparative statics problem to the
difference in nth degree risk between two probability distributions and the nth degree
of risk aversion. For the third degree risk comparison in the monetary cost problem,
our characterization of more Ross risk averse in the third degree coincides with more
downside risk averse, as recently defined by Modica and Scarsini [30]. On the other
hand, in the utility cost problem, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measures in the 3rd
degree coincide with the absolute prudence measures defined by Kimball [22].
In Chapter III, we analyze decisions made by a group of terrorists and a gov-
ernment in a zero-sum game where the terrorists minimize a representative citizen’s
expected utility and the government maximizes it. The terrorists’ strategy balances
the probability and the severity of the attack while the government chooses the level
of investment reducing the probability and/or mitigating the severity. We find that,
if the representative agent is risk neutral, the terrorists choose the level of severity
that does not depend on the government’s choice of activities, but provokes the high-
est level of counterterrorism activity. We also find that the citizen’s risk attitudes
affect the strategies of the terrorists and the government. When compared with a risk
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neutral population, a risk averse population in the target country leads the terrorists
to commit more damaging, but less frequent, attacks.
When the government’s activities mitigate the damages of an attack but do
not prevent an attack, increased risk aversion leads to increased counterterrorism
activities. However, when the government’s activities only prevent an attack but do
not mitigate the damages, the effect of risk aversion on the counterterrorism activities
depends on the probability of an attack. If an attack is not too likely, the government
spends more to prevent an attack when the representative citizen becomes more risk
averse. If an attack is likely, the government spends less to prevent an attack when
the representative citizen becomes more risk averse.
In Chapter IV, we discuss the option price which is defined by Cichetti and
Freeman [14] as an ex-ante willingness to pay for a good whose surplus is dependent
on state of nature. The difference between the option price and the expected surplus
is called option value. The option price has been used as an appropriate welfare
measure under risk under the assumption of expected utility, while the option value
has been interpreted as the risk premium. This interpretation is arguable since the
option value can be positive or negative, but the risk premium must be positive for
a risk-averse agent. We show that actually the option value is the buying price for
changing the payment from the state-dependent surplus to the expected surplus, and
it can be positive or negative.
We also show that Graham’s [21] model can be generalized to rank-dependent
expected utility. When there are two states of nature and two agents, an EU agent
and a pessimistic RDEU agent. If both have the same surplus, then the pessimistic
RDEU agent’s option value is larger in magnitude. In contrast, if an EU agent and
an optimistic RDEU agent have the same surplus, then the optimistic RDEU agent’s
option value is smaller in magnitude.
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